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Since the colonial era, laws criminalising same-sex conduct as well as gender 
expression have sought to curb the right of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender 
(LGBT) persons to freedom. However, recent times have seen a more powerful 
use of the constitutional framework to articulate, contrary to the criminal law, 
the rights of LGBT persons to freedom. A battle is now taking place between 
the old criminal law frameworks which shackle LGBT lives and the new 
constitutional interpretations which seek to confirm the inherent dignity to 
which LGBT persons are entitled. The rights of these individuals now stand 
precariously poised between empathy and contempt. 
This chapter will map this oscillation between empathy and contempt 
by discussing five emblematic cases. Two of them encompass the situation 
of LGBT people in colonial India, and the remaining three pertain to the 
contemporary era. They span the period between 1884 and 2014, and the 
stories hidden within their interstices tell us how the law confines LGBT 
people in terrifying and tragic ways but also how they challenge those 
confines in inspiring ways.
Two cases (Queen Empress v. Khairati1 and Nowshirwan v. Emperor2), which 
date from India’s colonial history, presage patterns of persecution of LGBT 
persons in present-day India in important ways. They speak to Khairati’s and 
Nowshirwan’s aspirations for a better world in terms of the freedoms they 
sought, but which were denied by the law. The three contemporary cases 
(Naz Foundation v. NCT Delhi;3 Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation;4 
1 I.L.R. 6 All 205. 
2 AIR 1934 Sind 206.
3 Delhi Law Times, vol. 160 (2009) 277. 
4 2013 (15) SCALE 55: MANU/SC/1278/2013.
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and National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India)5 are relatively well 
known and embody the politics of hope for a better future as well as its 
betrayal. 
Khairati and the question of gender identity 
The decision of Queen Empress v. Khairati in 1884 is the first reported case of 
the use of Section 3776 against a person described by the court as a ‘eunuch.’7 
The ironically named Justice Straight was called upon to adjudicate whether 
a person who was arrested by the police on grounds of habitually wearing 
women’s clothes had committed the offence under Section 377. The medical 
examination of Khairati, according to the judicial record, showed that Khairati 
had ‘syphilis and exhibited signs of a habitual sodomite, had indeed committed 
the offence of sodomy’.8 The sessions court judge noted: 
The man is not a eunuch in the literal sense, but he was called for 
by the police when on a visit to his village, and was found singing 
dressed as a woman among the women of a certain family. Having been 
subjected to examination by the Civil Surgeon … he is shown to have 
the characteristic mark of a habitual catamite – the distortion of the 
orifice of the anus into the shape of a trumpet and also to be affected 
with syphilis in the same region in a manner which distinctly points to 
unnatural intercourse within the last few months.9 
5 Supreme Court of India, National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India, 
and others, writ petition no. 400 of 2012 with writ petition no. 604 of 2013, 
judgment 15 Apr. 2014. See http://orinam.net/377/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/
Judgement_Nalsa_Transgenderrights.pdf (accessed 13 Mar. 2018).
6 Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code reads: ‘Unnatural sexual offences: Whoever 
voluntarily has carnal intercourse against the order of nature with any man, woman 
or animal, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or imprisonment … which 
may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation: Penetration is 
sufficient to constitute the carnal intercourse necessary to the offence described in 
this section.’
7 The term ‘eunuch’ is today seen as a derogatory reference to the transgender section 
of society known as the hijra community. This community in India has a recorded 
history of more than 4000 years. Most hijras live in groups that are organised 
into seven gharanas (houses), situated mainly in Hyderabad, Pune and Bombay. 
Each house is headed by a nayak, who appoints gurus, spiritual leaders who train 
their chelas (wards) in badhai (dancing, singing and blessing), and protect them 
within and outside the community. The system replicates matriarchy, creating 
interdependence between the ageing guru and the chela who has been cast out of 
her family. The nayak and senior gurus acting as lawmakers decide any disputes that 
take place among the hijras, and administer punishments such as imposing fines 
and expulsion from the community. 
8 Queen Empress v. Khairati I.L.R. 6 All 205. 
9 Ibid. 
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Justice Straight decided that while he ‘appreciate[d] the desire of the authorities 
at Moradabad to check these disgusting practices’, he was unable to convict 
Khairati, as ‘neither the individual with whom the offence was committed, nor 
the time of committal nor the place is ascertainable’.10 Although Khairati was 
acquitted in the end, the key point to note is the violence to which she was 
subjected during the entire legal and police process.
One should note the gratuitous violence of arresting a person merely 
because their gender does not match their biological sex. It can be conjectured 
that the arrest itself would not have been made with courtesy and civility as 
Khairati was considered to be a person engaged in what Justice Straight called 
‘disgusting practices’. This effectively put her outside the ‘human pale’, and one 
can only imagine the nature of the arrest. After it, she was subjected to an anal 
examination by the civil surgeon. The violation of bodily integrity and assault 
on her dignity emerges vividly. 
All in all, the figures of authority were complicit in weaving a discourse 
based upon an attitude of disgust towards Khairati, who transgressed the 
norms of gender and sexuality. The civil surgeon’s anal examination found 
that the shape of the anus indicated that sodomy had been committed. The 
district authorities of Moradabad found the practice of singing dressed as a 
woman sufficient to arrest Khairati, and Justice Straight, though he acquitted 
her, supported the authorities’ desire to ‘check these disgusting practices’. The 
silence in the judgment is the voice of Khairati herself. It can be inferred that 
Khairati, though born a man, identified as a woman and lived her life as one. 
The fact that she never denied having ‘dressed and ornamentated as a woman’11 
can be interpreted as an indication of how important her chosen gender was 
to her. In spite of the fact that Khairati had been arrested, subjected to an anal 
examination, and found not to be a eunuch but to possess male genitals, her 
chosen identity survived all her tormentors’ efforts to criminalise what to her 
must have appeared ‘natural’. It was her gender transgression that implicated 
Khairati as a potential criminal under Section 377, a reality that she never 
denied but continued to stubbornly own. Her insistence on her chosen gender 
gave Khairati a dignity that was difficult to obliterate.
Khairati’s case points to the fact that the person of transgressive gender is 
largely absent in the colonial legal record. The fragment that records Khairati’s 
travails speaks to the question of a larger absence from history of the lives 
and stories of those who were persecuted on grounds of their gender identity. 
Khairati’s story also points to the work to be done to find and tell the story 
of how the law in colonial India was used for persecution based on gender 
identity.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
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Nowshirwan v. Emperor: calling a new world into being12 
In a 1935 decision from Sind, a province of Pakistan, Nowshirwan Irani, a 
young Irani shopkeeper, was charged with having committed an offence under 
Section 377 with a youth aged about 18 called Ratansi. The prosecution story 
was that Ratansi visited the appellant’s hotel and had tea there. Nowshirwan 
asked Ratansi why he had not come to the hotel for a while, and was told that 
Ratansi had had no occasion to do so. The latter then went to the pier to take 
a boat, but on finding he had no money, came back to Masjid Street, where 
he saw Nowshirwan standing on the road a short distance from the hotel. 
Nowshirwan asked Ratansi to come to his house, and when he did, he locked 
the door and started taking liberties with the young man, who did not welcome 
the overtures and wanted to leave. Nowshirwan removed his trousers, loosened 
Ratansi’s trousers, and made the youth sit on top of his organ. Ratansi got up 
from his lap, but not before Nowshirwan had spent himself, wiped his organ 
and put on his pants. The reason this incident came to light was that Solomon, 
a police officer, and his friend Gulubuddin saw the incident through the 
keyhole, marched in, and took Ratansi and Nowshirwan to the police station. 
The judge was not convinced by the prosecution story that Nowshirwan 
had forced Ratansi to have carnal intercourse. He believed Ratansi had been 
made to pose as a complainant and as a result made hopelessly discrepant 
statements. The judge was not prepared to rely on the evidence of the 
eyewitnesses, Solomon and Gulubuddin, whose conduct he found strange. 
Further, the medical evidence could prove neither forcible sexual intercourse 
(the prosecution story) nor an attempt to commit the act of sodomy. In the 
judge’s opinion, ‘as the appellant had not even if we take the worst view against 
him gone beyond a certain stage of lascivious companionship, I do not think 
he deserves to be convicted for any of the offences with which he was charged 
or could have been charged’.13
The story of Nowshirwan and Ratansi seems to be one of sexual desire 
acting itself out between two men of different class backgrounds. The limited 
material present in the appellate decision gives us a clue that even the judge 
was convinced the nature of the relationship was consensual. As the judge 
noted: ‘Moreover the medical evidence militates against the story of a forcible 
connection on the cot [and] the appellant who is a fairly hefty young man 
having intercourse in the manner stated originally. There is not the slightest 
symptom of violence on the hind part of the lad.’ He concluded: ‘If he was in 
the house of the accused behind locked doors, I have not the slightest hesitation 
in believing that he had gone there voluntarily’.14
12 AIR 1934 Sind 206.
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
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The story of desire secreted within the judicial narrative seems to be that 
Nowshirwan and Ratansi knew each other and that the former made the first 
move on that fateful day. He asked Ratansi why he had not come to the hotel 
for some time. Ratansi left after finishing his tea, only to come back in the same 
direction. When he returned, Nowshirwan was waiting on the road and asked 
him to come to his house. They seemed to have some sort of prearranged code 
by which they signalled to each other the desire to meet, and subsequently they 
went to Nowshirwan’s room. However, owing to the misfortune of their liaison 
having been witnessed by an over-zealous policeman or a policeman with a 
grudge, what should have been an intimate act between two consenting parties 
in their bedroom became a public scandal. 
The prosecution sought to twist a consenting act between two men into a 
story of Ratansi being forced to have sex with Nowshirwan. The former was 
coerced by those around him into posing as a complainant against the very 
person with whom he had earlier had a consenting sexual relationship. The 
fact that it was consenting did nothing to exculpate Ratansi from becoming a 
victim of judicial ire. Indeed, the judge reserved particular fury for him. 
In the judge’s words, Ratansi ‘appears to be a despicable specimen of humanity. 
On his own admission he is addicted to the vice of a catamite. The doctor who 
has examined him is of the opinion that the lad must have been used frequently 
for unnatural carnal intercourse.’ In the course of appreciating the medical 
evidence, the judge noted: ‘There was not the slightest symptom of violence on 
the hind part of the lad’.15 Thus, the story of an encounter between two people 
of the same sex who desired each other, was reduced in the judicial reading to an 
act of a perverse failed sexual connection. The use of terms like ‘animal-like’ and 
‘despicable’ placed the sexual act within the framework of moral abhorrence. One 
has to read between the lines of the judicial text to hazard a guess as to the nature 
of the intimacy between Nowshirwan and Ratansi. The two knew each other and 
had possibly met before in Nowshirwan’s room, which might possibly have been 
a space where the coercive heterosexism of the outside world could be forgotten 
for the brief time that they spent with each other. That short interlude might 
have been a moment when they imagined a world not yet born and a time yet to 
come, when their desire would be accepted without a murmur. This imaginative 
realm of impossible desires was what was rudely interrupted when the policeman, 
Solomon, spied through the keyhole. 
It can be surmised that Solomon had noticed their previous meetings, 
hence he was on the alert to take action on that eventful day in Sind in 1935. 
Solomon stands for the compulsory heterosexism of the larger world or what 
Oscar Wilde would have called the ‘unnatural virtue’ in which the world 
abounds, which will give no space for the expression of any intimacy that 
challenges its own laws. 
15 Ibid.
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It was this fragile experiment of creating a ‘little community of love’ (Liang 
and Narrain, 2009), outside the bounds of law’s strictures and societal norms, 
that society was attacking via Solomon, giving it the judicial imprimatur of a 
‘failed sexual connection’. The tragic story of Nowshirwan and Ratansi speaks 
to the absence of a certain vocabulary. The language of love and intimacy, 
longing and desire, and the expression of spontaneous bodily affection, find no 
safe habitation within the terms of the law which degrades such experimental 
creation of new forms of intimacy. Its language has an impoverishing effect as 
it strips the physical act of the rich emotional connotations of human intimacy 
and reduces it to a ‘perverse failed sexual connection’. By stripping the act of sex 
of its multiple meanings, it produces Nowshirwan as a subject of the criminal 
law. 
One could look at Nowshirwan and Ratansi as being unwitting frontiersmen 
in the history of the battle against Section 377 and as being among its first 
recorded tragic victims. In another register, Nowshirwan and Ratansi stand 
in for Oscar Wilde and Lord Alfred Douglas, with Ratansi not just forced to 
become a witness against Nowshirwan but also to deny a part of his own being 
in terms of his role in creating that ‘little community of love’. Just as Oscar 
Wilde was betrayed by Alfred Douglas, who described his lover as ‘the greatest 
force for evil that has appeared in Europe during the last three hundred and 
fifty years’ (Murray, 2000, p. 221),16 so too was Nowshirwan, in his hour of 
greatest need, betrayed by Ratansi who became the complainant against him. 
Their story exemplifies the perversities of a law that turns lover against lover 
and converts an act of intimacy into the crime of carnal intercourse. 
Nowshirwan’s story remains emblematic of the ethical and moral 
poverty of the judicial discourse, even though it grappled with homosexual 
expression for more than 158 years. It is important to note that despite the 
Indian Constitution coming into force with the language of equality, non-
discrimination and dignity, the judiciary in the postcolonial era continued to 
characterise homosexuality with terms such as ‘unnatural’, ‘perversity of mind’ 
and ‘immoral’. The ethical language of dignity and rights was never perceived 
as applying to LGBT persons (see Narrain, 2008).
16 Though it should be noted that this statement was made a long time after Oscar 
Wilde’s three trials. During the trial and its immediate aftermath, Lord Alfred 
Douglas stood by Oscar Wilde. He was the only friend of Oscar Wilde to remain 
in London during the trial, even though he was under threat of arrest. He also 
petitioned the authorities to release Oscar Wilde. As Murray notes: ‘Unlike Wilde’s 
other friends, Douglas worked for him tirelessly, never giving up hope that he might 
be able to change if not the sentence, at least other people’s attitude to it’ (2000, p. 
92). 
49THE INDIAN JUDICIARY AND LGBT RIGHTS
Naz Foundation v. NCT Delhi: the promise of hope17 
The first time the judiciary moved outside the range of responses outlined 
above was 158 years after the Indian Penal Code came into force and 59 
years after the Indian Constitution did so. The social context pertaining in 
the late 1990s and the beginning of the new century differed dramatically 
from the one that existed at the time of Nowshirwan’s persecution. The norms 
that straitjacketed Nowshirwan and Ratansi from expressing their sexual 
identity, and the law that deemed the former a criminal, were beginning to 
be questioned. This practice of questioning the set ways of the heterosexist 
world began with the queer struggle’s emergence with its insistence on 
problematising norms of gender and sexuality. It is this context of an emerging 
LGBT community − one that simply did not exist in Nowshirwan’s and 
Ratansi’s day − that underpins any present-day engagement with Section 377. 
In simple terms, when people like Nowshirwan have been arrested under the 
law in recent times, people beyond the family and friend network have got 
involved. Queer people across the country rally together and begin to support 
those who are subjected to the law’s persecution. Thus, any story about those 
who are arrested under Section 377, be it the arrest of gay men in Lucknow 
(2006) or the arrest of HIV/AIDS workers in Lucknow (2001), become part 
of a contemporary history of struggle against Section 377. This stands in stark 
contrast to the persecution of frontiersmen in earlier struggles against it, such 
as Nowshirwan and Ratansi. 
The bringing together of the stories of Nowshirwan and Ratansi, and 
those persecuted under the law in contemporary times, has culminated in a 
legal challenge to that very same law. The Lawyers Collective filed a petition 
challenging Section 377 on behalf of the Naz Foundation before the Delhi 
High Court in 2001.18 It challenged the constitutional validity of Section 377, 
and made an argument for it to exclude the criminalisation of same-sex acts 
between consenting adults in private. In technical terms, the petition asked for 
the statute to be ‘read down’ to exclude the criminalisation of same-sex acts 
between consenting adults in private, limiting the use of Section 377 to cases 
of child sexual abuse. 
The important shift that had been made, as compared with the colonial 
period, was the use of the fundamental rights chapter to test the constitutional 
validity of the law. In particular, the petition argued that Section 377 violated 
17 Delhi High Court, 2009, Naz Foundation v. NCT Delhi, 160 Delhi Law Times, 277. 
18 Materials filed in the Delhi High Court are on file with the Alternative Law Forum 
(ALF).
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Figure 8. Protest against the Supreme Court ruling that reinstated Section 377, recriminalising 
consensual same-sex acts in India, Delhi, India, 11 December 2013. Photo credit: No Easy Walk 
to Freedom, Envisioning Global LGBT Human Rights.
the right to equality,19 the right to privacy and dignity,20 and the right to 
expression.21 
The petition itself, though filed by a single non-governmental organisation 
(NGO), gradually began to represent the entire community. The Lawyers 
Collective and the Naz Foundation began this process of making a ‘public 
interest litigation’ truly ‘public’ by hosting a series of meetings dealing with 
different stages of the petition. Over the next seven years, this process of 
continuous consultation with the community contributed towards Section 377 
becoming a more politicised issue, a process that in turn led to Voices Against 
377, a Delhi-based coalition of NGOs working for the rights of LGBT persons, 
women and children, filing an intervention. The petition’s key stages included 
the affidavit filed by the Union of India (home ministry), which indicated that 
the government would stand by the law; the affidavit filed by the National 
AIDS Control Organization (NACO), which in effect said that Section 377 
impeded HIV/AIDS efforts; and the impleadment of Joint Action Kannur 
(JACK, an organisation denying that HIV causes AIDS) and of B.P. Singhal (a 
former Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) Member of Parliament, who represented 
the opinion of the Hindu right wing that homosexuality was against Indian 
culture).
19 Art. 14. The state shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal 
protection of the laws within the territory of India.
20 Art. 21. No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according 
to procedure established by law.
21 Art. 19. (1) All citizens shall have the right – (a) to freedom of speech and expression.
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Completely new was the chance to challenge the law under which Khairati 
and Nowshirwan had been prosecuted. The challenge could now be posed 
in terms of the Indian Constitution, which came into force in 1950, on the 
basis that the law violates the fundamental rights of LGBT citizens. Even 
though it is now possible to mount such a challenge, India, especially in the 
post-liberalisation era, has not been a hospitable space in recent times, and 
is certainly not a final refuge for those characterised by the Supreme Court 
as the ‘oppressed and the bewildered’.22 In fact, the Supreme Court has been 
positively hostile to a whole range of applicants, right from slum dwellers to 
all sections of organised labour (see Suresh and Narrain, 2015). So it was with 
trepidation that queer activists awaited the hearing. How would the judges 
understand the complex issue of sexuality and rights? How indeed would we 
be able to persuade them that this was a rights issue? 
The judiciary has generally been subject to analysis in terms of the reasoned 
argument and the decided case. In contrast, little attention has been paid to 
the gamut of other kinds of responses by judges day-to-day in the courts: 
their questions, their expressions, the tone of their comments, their personal 
reactions. As Lawrence Liang (2007) noted: 
Witnessing the courts functioning on a day-to-day basis also allows you 
to uncover another secret archive, an archive of humiliation and power. 
It is said that seventy per cent of our communication is non-verbal and 
this must be true of legal communication as well. The secret archive 
that interests me consists not of well-reasoned judgments or even the 
unreasonable admonishment of the courts, but the various symbolic 
signs and gestures that accompany them. An incomplete index of the 
archive includes the stare, the smirk, the haughty laugh, the raised 
eyebrow, the indifferent yawn, the disdainful smile and the patronising 
nod amongst many others.
 In this secret archive of what Liang correctly characterises as ‘humiliation 
and power’, another category of responses emerged almost as a complete 
surprise. These can be characterised as representing the quality of judicial 
empathy. The questions and comments of the judges in the Naz case revealed 
not the intention to humiliate but instead a strong sense of their empathy 
for the suffering of LGBT persons. Chief Justice Shah communicated this 
empathy in ample measure and took judicial notice of the social discourse of 
homophobia by saying that we all know the kind of sneers and mockery this 
issue attracts in society. To substantiate this point, he narrated the moving 
instance of a boy mocked for his sexuality and thus unable to take his exam. 
It was in this context of harassment that the boy approached the court for a 
chance to do his exam again (Narrain and Eldridge, 2009, p. 49).
During the hearings the judges displayed sensitivity, not only to instances 
of brutal violence but equally to the more subtle language of discrimination. 
22 State of Rajasthan v. Union of India (1977) 3 SCC 634 at 70 (per Justice Goswami).
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This created a magical space for the brief duration of the court proceedings. 
Lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons, who were so used to the sneers 
and jeers of society, suddenly felt that they were not only being heard but also 
respected. Simply through the art of empathetic listening the judges restored 
dignity to a section of society upon whom the government seemed intent on 
pouring nothing but contempt and scorn. The judges involved in the hearings 
did something unique. They spoke about sex without a sneer, and for the first 
time in the recorded judicial history of India homosexual sex was discussed 
within a context of intimacy, love, affection and longing. That discourse became 
part of the judicial register and displaced the relentless focus on the stripped 
down homosexual act as a threat to civilisation at its very roots. The conflation 
of homosexuality with excess, through the focus on group sex, was challenged 
by the nature of judicial questioning, and the discourse about homosexuality 
was linked to contexts of emotion and feeling. A new path was being forged in 
learning to talk about the intimacy that Nowshirwan and Ratansi shared, within 
the terms of the law. For the first time, it seemed possible to see Nowshirwan 
and Ratansi and many others like them in terms other than the basely carnal, 
and for opening up that possibility, one should credit the empathetic listening 
demonstrated by Chief Justice Shah and Justice Muralidhar. 
In such circumstances, the Naz judgment could well have been justified 
in making the argument for the decriminalisation of homosexuality, based on 
Hart’s (1967) position that it was not the law’s business to regulate a zone of 
private morality. Such an understanding would have been sufficient to achieve 
the result of reading down Section 377 to exclude consensual sex between 
adults from the ambit of criminalisation. However, the judges chose to tread 
a more ambitious path. They began their written decision by referencing Dr 
Ambedkar, who in the Constituent Assembly had noted: ‘Constitutional 
morality is not a natural sentiment. It has to be cultivated. We must realise that 
our people have yet to learn it. Democracy in India is only a top dressing on an 
Indian soil which is essentially undemocratic.’23 They continued:
Popular morality or public disapproval of certain acts is not a valid 
justification for restriction of the fundamental rights under Article 21. 
Popular morality, as distinct from a constitutional morality derived 
from constitutional values, is based on shifting and subjective notions 
of right and wrong. If there is any type of ‘morality’ that can pass the 
test of compelling state interest, it must be ‘constitutional’ morality and 
not public morality.24
In addition: ‘Moral indignation, howsoever strong, is not a valid basis for 
overriding individuals’ fundamental rights of dignity and privacy. In our 
23 Naz Foundation v. Union of India and others (para. 79), see https://indiankanoon.
org/doc/100472805/ (accessed 27 Feb. 2018).
24 Ibid. 
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scheme of things, constitutional morality must outweigh the argument of 
public morality, even if it be the majoritarian view.’25
What the judges did, by articulating the notion of constitutional morality, 
was to change the terms within which the judiciary considered homosexual 
expression. From the first tentative steps when Hart, as well as the famous 
Wolfenden Committee Report, had made space within the law for ‘private 
immorality’, now homosexual expression was to be seen as not just something 
that has to be ‘tolerated’, but rather as something that needs to be protected. 
This is because protecting the expression of homosexuality goes to the heart of 
the meaning of the freedoms guaranteed under the Indian Constitution. In a 
reversal of the terms of the debate, it became ‘moral’ to protect LGBT rights 
and ‘immoral’ to criminalise people on grounds of their sexuality. 
Constitutional morality in the judges’ reading requires that LGBT persons 
are treated as equal citizens of India, that they cannot be discriminated against 
on grounds of their sexual orientation, and that their right to express themselves 
through their intimate choice of partner must be fully respected. It’s only when 
the dignity of LGBT persons is respected that the Indian Constitution lives up 
to its foundational promise. Taken one step further, constitutional morality 
also requires the court to play the role of a counter-majoritarian institution, 
which takes upon itself the responsibility of protecting constitutionally 
entrenched rights, regardless of what the majority may believe. In the judges’ 
apt conclusion: 
If there is one constitutional tenet that can be said to be underlying 
theme of the Indian Constitution, it is that of ‘inclusiveness’. This 
Court believes that the Indian Constitution reflects this value deeply 
ingrained in Indian society, nurtured over several generations. The 
inclusiveness that Indian society traditionally displayed, literally in 
every aspect of life, is manifest in recognising a role in society for 
everyone. Those perceived by the majority as ‘deviants’ or ‘different’ are 
not on that score excluded or ostracised.26
The theme of ‘constitutional morality’ thus brings about a paradigm shift in the 
way the law looks at LGBT persons. Protecting their rights is not only about 
guaranteeing a despised minority their rightful place in the constitutional 
shade, but it equally speaks to the vision of the kind of country we all want to 
live in and what it means for the majority. 
Indian law seems to have traversed the journey from Nowshirwan to the 
Naz Foundation, from being persecuted for same-sex intimacy to making 
some space for the ‘little communities of love’. However, the victory in some 
ways proved fragile, as the decision in 2013 in Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz 
Foundation27 was to show. 
25 Ibid., para. 86. 
26 Ibid., para. 130. 
27 2013 (15) SCALE 55: MANU/SC/1278/2013. 
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Suresh Kumar Koushal and the failure of citizenship 
Suresh Kumar Koushal, an astrologer, was not a party before the Delhi High 
Court in the Naz case. He brought a Special Leave Petition (SLP) challenging 
the Naz decision before the Supreme Court just seven days after the historic 
Delhi High Court judgment. He was joined subsequently by 14 others from 
the spectrum of Indian society, comprising all religions, all united by one 
thing only, opposition to the Naz judgment.28 This vociferous opposition from 
representatives of all major Indian faiths prompted a response from those in 
favour of the Delhi High Court judgment. As a result, the parties before that 
court, Voices Against 377 and Naz Foundation, were joined by 19 parents of 
LGBT persons, 14 mental health professionals, 11 law teachers, 16 teachers 
and Shyam Benegal, a public-spirited intellectual, who all filed interventions 
before the Supreme Court. 
The information brought before the court in the Koushal petition by those 
supporting the Naz judgment included affidavits testifying to harassment 
and violence, all inflicted under the shadow of Section 377. However, in its 
judgment the court chose to disregard the violations it had caused. With 
infamous logic, the judges concluded:
A miniscule fraction of the country’s population constitute lesbians, 
gays, bisexuals or transgenders and in last more than 150 years less 
than 200 persons have been prosecuted (as per the reported orders) 
for committing offence under Section 377 IPC and this cannot be 
made sound basis for declaring that section ultra vires the provisions of 
Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution.29
The decision is best described in Vikram Seth’s eloquent words as a ‘bad day 
for law and love’ (2013). As an exercise in reasoning, the Koushal judgment 
failed to demonstrate why it reached the conclusion that Section 377 was 
constitutionally valid. However, the failure of the Koushal case goes beyond 
a mere breakdown in reasoning, to questions that go to the heart of what the 
28 Suresh Kumar Koushal and another v. Naz Foundation and others, Special Leave 
Petition (SLP) no. 15436 of 2009 was the first SLP to be filed against the Naz 
judgment. Since then, 15 other parties have also filed SLPs challenging the Naz 
judgment: Apostolic Churches Alliance through its Bishop v. Naz Foundation; S.K. 
Tizarawala v. Naz Foundation; Bhim Singh v. Naz Foundation; B. Krishna Bhat 
v. Naz Foundation; B.P. Singhal v. Naz Foundation; S.D. Pratinidhi Sabha v. Naz 
Foundation; Delhi Commission for Protection of Child Rights v. Naz Foundation; 
Ram Murti v. Government of NCT of Delhi; Krantikari Manuvadi Morcha Party v. 
Naz Foundation; Raza Academy v. Naz Foundation; Tamil Nadu Muslim Munnetra 
Kazhagam v. Naz Foundation; Utkal Christian Council v. Naz Foundation; Trust 
Gods Ministry v. Naz Foundation; All India Muslim Personal Law Board v. Naz 
Foundation; Joint Action Kannur v. Naz Foundation. 
29 Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation, 2013 (15) SCALE 55: MANU/
SC/1278/2013.
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Indian Constitution means (Coalition for Sex Workers and Sexual Minorities’ 
Rights, 2014).
Beyond equality, privacy and dignity, the one concept developed in the Naz 
judgment that has resonated widely is the notion of constitutional morality. 
In an inspired move, Justice Shah went to the Indian Constituent Assembly 
Debates. Employing the concept of constitutional morality as articulated by 
noted jurist, economist, politician and social reformer, Dr B.R. Ambedkar, 
the judge made the point that a notion of public morality cannot be used as a 
basis to deprive a minority of their rights. In other words, if India was a form 
of democracy based upon majority rule only, then ‘any legislative transient 
majority in tantrums against any minority’30 could discriminate at will against 
women, Muslims, Christians and disabled people. Rejecting this notion of 
majoritarian oppression, the Naz court underlined the point that India is a 
constitutional democracy rooted in a tradition of inclusiveness, and therefore 
the fundamental rights of all persons of whatever stripe or persuasion are 
non-negotiable. The Naz court applied this notion of constitutional morality 
derived from Dr Ambedkar, and the notion of inclusiveness as expressed in 
1947 by Jawaharlal Nehru,31 to LGBT persons. The ruling was based on a 
profound appreciation of the deepest meaning of the Indian Constitution’s 
commitment to protect the fundamental rights of all persons and groups, 
however ‘miniscule’ those groups might be. 
It is this particular understanding of the Constitutional Court’s role 
that the Koushal judgment failed to appreciate. By arguing that it was duty 
bound to respect the will of parliament, which represented the ‘will of 
the people’, it abdicated the responsibility of the judiciary to protect all 
minorities from the vicissitudes of majority opinion. Its conclusion that 
a ‘miniscule fraction of the country’s population constitute lesbians, gays, 
bisexuals or transgenders’, and hence it was unnecessary to adjudicate the 
30 Concurring opinion of J. Krishna Iyer in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 
I SCC para. 81. 
31 In his ‘Tryst with destiny’ speech, Constituent Assembly, delivered at midnight, 
14−15 Aug. 1947, on the eve of independence, available at: http://nehrumemorial.
nic.in/en/gift-gallery.html?id=214&tmpl=component (accessed 27 Feb. 2018). 
Nehru, while introducing the Objectives Resolution, which went on to become the 
Preamble of the Indian Constitution noted: ‘Words are magic things often enough, 
but even the magic of words sometimes cannot convey the magic of the human spirit 
and of a Nation’s passion [… The Resolution] seeks very feebly to tell the world of 
what we have thought or dreamt of so long, and what we now hope to achieve in the 
near future.’ The Naz judgment read Nehru’s aspiration as an aim for inclusiveness. 
As they put it: ‘Where society can display inclusiveness and understanding, such 
persons can be assured of a life of dignity and non-discrimination. This was the 
“spirit behind the Resolution” of which Nehru spoke so passionately.’ See Naz 
Foundation v. NCT Delhi. 
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validity of Section 377, did profound disservice to the very meaning of 
Indian constitutionalism.32
While reason is a key component of the law, emotion is not alien to it 
either. Judicial decisions at their best are not cold and unfeeling but display 
a profound empathy for human suffering. A court that is moved by human 
suffering produces judgments like that for the pavement-dwellers (Olga Tellis)33 
and the bonded labourers (Bandhua Mukti Morcha).34 It could be argued that 
by responding to human suffering, judges embody a form of constitutional 
compassion that should really be at the heart of the judicial function. 
This idea of compassion as central to the very purpose of the constitution 
finds a place in Jawaharlal Nehru’s famous ‘Tryst with destiny’ Constituent 
Assembly speech of 1947 to welcome India’s independence. Referring to 
Gandhi, he said: ‘The ambition of the greatest man of our generation has been 
to wipe every tear from every eye. That may be beyond us but as long as there 
are tears and suffering, so long our work will not be over’. Clearly, from the 
perspective as articulated by Nehru, constitutional functionaries – such as the 
judges of the Supreme Court – should bear in mind that they have a great 
constitutional responsibility to redress the causes of ‘tears and suffering’. In 
Koushal, the court turned a blind eye to human suffering. Two affidavits read 
out in court testify to this wilful blindness. Senior counsel, Mr Shyam Divan, 
32 Ibid. 
33 Olga Tellis and others v. Bombay Municipal Corporation and others etc., see https://
indiankanoon.org/doc/709776/ (accessed 27 Feb. 2018).
34 Bandhua Muki Morcha v. Union of India and others, see https://indiankanoon.org/
doc/595099/ (accessed 27 Feb. 2018).
Figure 9. Pride, Delhi, India, 28 November 2011. Photo credit: No Easy Walk to Freedom, 
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read out the one from Kokila, a transgender person who was brutally raped by 
the police. 
In the police station I was subjected to brutal torture. The police 
took me to a room inside the police station, stripped me naked and 
handcuffed my hands to a window. Six policemen all of whom seemed 
to be drunk, allegedly drunk, hit me with lathis and their hands and 
kicked me with their boots. They abused me using sexually violent 
language, including the statements: ‘we will fuck your mother’, ‘we will 
fuck your sister’, khoja [derogatory word used against transgenders] 
and gandu [one who gets penetrated anally, a derogatory word].
I suffered severe injuries on my hands, palms, buttocks, shoulder and 
legs. The police also burned my nipples and chapdi [vaginal part of 
the hijra body] with a burning coir rope. One policeman of the rank 
of SI [Sub Inspector of Police] positioned his rifle on my chapdi and 
threatened to shoot me. He also tried pushing the rifle butt and lathi 
into the chapdi and kept saying, ‘Do you have a vagina, can this go 
inside?’ while other policemen were laughing. This was done with the 
specific purpose of insulting me by insisting that I as a transsexual 
woman was not a real woman as I was not born with a vagina.35
Senior counsel, Mr Ashok Desai, read out the second affidavit from Vijaylaxmi 
Rai Chaudhari, the mother of a gay man:
My child is living with the agony and disrespect of being penalised at 
any point of time under an unjust law. It stopped him from coming out 
for long. Even after he came out, he always felt insulted since he can’t 
live his life equally celebrated and accepted by the law and the society. 
The thought that Anis could for no fault of his own be harassed by the 
state, makes Section 377 totally unacceptable for any otherwise law-
abiding, just and self-respecting citizen.36
The narratives of rape, torture and harassment suffered by LGBT persons 
did not move the court, nor did the reports of parents of LGBT persons, 
who stated that the law induces a profound sense of fear and destroys the 
ability to enjoy a peaceful family life. As such, the judgment profoundly fails 
to satisfy constitutional promises. Beyond the question of law, Koushal also 
does disservice to the idea that a place exists where law and love can meet. The 
right to love was left unspoken in Naz. Although Naz never used that phrase, 
the decision did open out judicial horizons to the possibility of a place where 
law could generously meet love.37 Until the Naz judgment, the lives of LGBT 
35 On file with the ALF. 
36 On file with the ALF.
37 Justice (retd.) A.P. Shah (2015) noted: ‘The Delhi High Court judgment started 
an important conversation in this country, one that is spiritedly continuing today, 
and that is compelling a move away from the language of homophobia, towards a 
vocabulary of choice, personal autonomy, the fundamental right to love, and greater 
sensitivity towards the “variability of the human kind”’. 
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persons were understood merely in terms of the desired freedom to perform 
certain sex acts in the privacy of bedrooms. Naz was instrumental in breaking 
down those closet doors and strongly asserting that ‘the sense of gender and 
sexual orientation of the person are so embedded in the individual that the 
individual carries this aspect of his or her identity wherever he or she goes’.38 
From this articulation of sexual orientation and gender identity (SOGI) as 
integral aspects of personhood, the judges continued: ‘It is not for the state 
to choose or to arrange the choice of partner, but for the partners to choose 
themselves.’39 
Thus, Naz asserted that questions pertaining to SOGI were not really about 
the freedom to perform sexual acts in private but rather about the identity 
and personhood that flows from the freedom to form profound intimate 
attachments with people of your own choosing. It is this right to a form of 
public expression of an individual’s personhood – which goes beyond what they 
do in their own bedroom – that is deeply imperilled by the Koushal judgment. 
For all those who believe in the right of individuals to express themselves 
through forming intimate attachments not constrained by the barriers of caste, 
religion and sexuality, the decision in Koushal represents an undeniable setback. 
National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India: recognising 
transgender citizenship 
A little over four months since the serious setback suffered by those involved in 
the Suresh Kumar Koushal case, another bench of the Supreme Court delivered 
a remarkably progressive judgment in National Legal Services Authority v. Union 
of India,40 this time in the context of transgender rights. 
The judges began with a powerful acknowledgement of the wrongs inflicted 
on the transgender community. 
Our society often ridicules and abuses the Transgender community 
and in public places like railway stations, bus stands, schools, 
workplaces, malls, theatres, hospitals, they are side-lined and treated 
as untouchables, forgetting the fact that the moral failure lies in the 
society’s unwillingness to contain or embrace different gender identities 
and expressions, a mindset which we have to change.41
They then traced out a place for the transgender community in both Indian 
mythology and history. By referring to its presence in two great epics of India, 
38 Naz Foundation v. NCT Delhi. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Supreme Court of India, National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India 
and others, writ petition no. 400 of 2012 with writ petition no. 604 of 2013, 
judgment 15 Apr. 2014. See http://orinam.net/377/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/
Judgement_Nalsa_Transgenderrights.pdf (accessed 13 Mar. 2018).
41 Ibid., pp. 1–2.
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the Mahabharata and Ramayana, the judges recognised a cultural sanction to 
transgender existence. The fact that this section of society was not discriminated 
against and in fact was a part of the ruling class under the Muslim Mughal 
rulers was also referenced by the judgment. In the court’s opinion, the reasons 
for the current abject status of the hijra community had to do with colonial 
intervention. In 1871 the British passed the Criminal Tribes Act under which 
the very existence of the hijra community was rendered criminal. By referencing 
the unjust arrest of Khairati,42 which, as noted above, was the first documented 
case of the use of Section 377, the judges recognised that using it formed 
another part of the colonial apparatus that ends up targeting the hijra person. 
The judgment holds that the denial of rights to the transgender community is 
a violation of the right to equality (Article 14), the right to non-discrimination 
(Article 15), the right to affirmative action (Article 16), the right to freedom of 
expression (Article 19(1)(a)) and the right to dignity (Article 21).
The National Legal Services Authority judgment (NALSA judgment) is 
particularly innovative in its understanding of what freedom of expression 
means. In the judges’ opinion: 
Gender identity, therefore, lies at the core of one’s personal identity, 
gender expression and presentation and, therefore, it will have to 
be protected under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. A 
transgender’s personality could be expressed by the transgender’s 
behavior and presentation. State cannot prohibit, restrict or interfere 
with a transgender’s expression of such personality, which reflects that 
inherent personality.43
The judges also read the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 very 
broadly: ‘Legal recognition of gender identity is, therefore, part of right to 
dignity and freedom guaranteed under our Constitution … Self-determination 
of gender is an integral part of personal autonomy and self-expression and 
falls within the realm of personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the 
Constitution of India.’44 In conclusion, the judges held that: 
Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity 
includes any discrimination, exclusion, restriction or preference, which 
has the effect of nullifying or transposing equality by the law or the 
equal protection of laws guaranteed under our Constitution, and hence 
we are inclined to give various directions to safeguard the constitutional 
rights of the members of the TG community.45
The NALSA judgment was remarkable both for its inclusive language and its 
range of progressive orders. The state and central governments were directed to 
42 Queen Empress v. Khairati.
43 Supreme Court of India, National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India,and 
others, as above.
44 Ibid., p. 69.
45 Ibid., p. 73.
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implement a spectrum of measures on health, social welfare and combatting 
stigma. The state was also directed to recognise the self-identified gender 
of persons, be they male, female or third gender, without surgery being a 
prerequisite. 
The NALSA judgment stands in stark contrast to the Koushal one. The 
former implicitly acknowledges the contradiction between the worldviews 
of the two courts. Though the judges stated that they could not express an 
opinion on the constitutionality of Section 377 – since that question had 
already been adjudicated in Koushal – they made the important point that 
Khairati’s persecution highlighted the fact that ‘even though he was acquitted 
on appeal, this case would demonstrate that Section 377, though associated 
with specific sexual acts, highlighted certain identities, including Hijras and 
was used as an instrument of harassment and physical abuse against Hijras and 
transgender persons.’46
The fact that the Koushal and National Legal Services Authority cases 
expressed such contrary opinions on the impact of Section 377 only highlights 
the need for a larger bench of the Supreme Court to resolve the contradiction. 
Towards a conclusion 
The stories of Khairati and Nowshirwan illustrate the lack of a language of 
empathy and a judicial inability to comprehend what Khairati and Nowshirwan 
experienced. Unfortunately, this lack continues into independent India. Too 
often it has not been seen fit to apply the language of the Indian Constitution 
to LGBT persons and their lives. It was only in 2009 that the Naz decision 
cracked open this legal mould. In the decision, the limited legal view that 
LGBT lives only raise issues of criminal law under Section 377 was broken. 
Only after this judgement could the courts and the wider public begin to see 
these issues and these lives through the lens of the rights to equality, dignity 
and privacy. 
The fact that the 2009 decision was overturned in 2013 in Koushal, and 
LGBT persons were denied their constitutional rights, was a setback. The 
acknowledgement of the discrimination faced by the transgender community 
and the fact that the people who belong to it are full human beings with rights 
in NALSA, won back part of what was lost through Koushal. The Supreme 
Court has now decided to re-examine Koushal through the constitution of a 
new bench in the curative petition. This has reignited hope that the judgment 
will be set aside. The Supreme Court, in its order dated 2 February 2016, 
noted:
Since the issues sought to be raised are of considerable importance and 
public interest and some of the issues have constitutional dimensions 
including whether the curative petitions qualify for consideration of 
46 Ibid., pp. 13–14. 
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this court in the light of the judgement in Rupa Hurra’s case, it will 
be more appropriate if these petitions are placed before a Constitution 
bench comprising five Honourable Judges of this Court.47
One hopes that the Supreme Court will resolve the contradiction between 
Koushal and NALSA in favour of a broader and more encompassing vision 
of LGBT people as full human beings entitled to all human rights. Such a 
decision would honour the constitutional promise of full equality for all 
persons, regardless of SOGI. However, until such time as the court takes a 
decisive step in favour of LGBT rights, it should be noted that rights are won 
not only in the courts but also on the streets. The right to expression, as well 
as the right to love, continues to be asserted in myriad ways, despite the court 
decision in Koushal. The question really is: ‘How long will a decision that goes 
against a right that has been established on the ground continue to stand?’
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